Discrete-choice demand models are important and fundamental tools for understanding consumers' choice behavior, and for analyzing firms' operations and pricing strategies. In these models, products are often described as a vector of observed characteristics. A consumer chooses the product that maximizes her utility, assumed to be a function of the observed product characteristics and the consumer's preference over these product characteristics. One central task in the demand estimation literature is to, based on observed data, infer consumers' preferences on product characteristics. We consider such an estimation problem for pure characteristics models, a class of random-coefficients demand models without the idiosyncratic logit error term in a consumer's utility function. The absence of the logit error term and the use of numerical integration to approximate the integral in aggregate market shares lead to a nonsmooth formulation of approximated market share equations. As a result, solving the approximated market share equations and estimating the model by using existing methods proposed in the econometrics literature remain computationally intractable. To overcome this difficulty, we first characterize consumers' purchase decisions by a system of complementarity constraints. This new characterization leads to smooth approximated market share equations and allows us to cast the corresponding generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation problem essentially as a quadratic program with linear complementarity constraints, parameterized by an exponential, thus nonlinear, function of the structural parameter on price. We also extend this estimation framework to incorporate an endogenous pricing mechanism that captures the competitive profit maximization behavior of the producing firms. We provide existence results of a solution for the GMM estimator and present numerical results to demonstrate the computational effectiveness of our approach.
Introduction
Discrete-choice demand models are important and fundamental tools for understanding consumers' choice behavior, studying firms' operations and pricing strategies, and analyzing the effect of price changes on consumer welfare; see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) and the references therein. The use of demand models has been prevalent in empirical industrial organization and quantitative marketing in the past few decades. In the recent operations research and operations management literature, there has been an increasing interest in studying firms' price and assortment optimization problems under various demand models; see e.g., Hansen and Martin (1996) , Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) , Vulcano, van Ryzin and Ratliff (2012) , and Gallego and Wang (2014) .
Among the demand models proposed in the literature, the multinomial logit model (McFadden (1974 (McFadden ( , 1981 ) is perhaps the most commonly used because of its computational tractability. However, in multinomial logit models, consumers have homogeneous preferences. Other undesirable implications in using multinomial logit models include unrealistic price elasticities and substitution patterns among products. These concerns render multinomial logit models more suitable for theoretical modeling analysis but less ideal in the empirical setting. Aiming to address these concerns, Berry, Levinsohn, and, Pakes (1995) , hereafter BLP, propose a random-coefficients logit demand model and provide a methodology to estimate heterogenous consumers' preferences over observed product characteristics in a differentiated product setting.
In the BLP and other logit demand models, including the i.i.d. idiosyncratic logit error term in a consumer's utility function gives rise to smooth market share equations and simplifies the computational aspect of estimating the parameters in the underlying demand models. However, as discussed in Ackergerg, Benkard, , the inclusion of the idiosyncratic logit error term in the model also implies that every product will have a positive market share, regardless of product characteristics or price. To address this undesirable implication, Berry and Pakes (2007) propose the pure characteristics demand model, in which the i.i.d logit error term is removed from a consumer's utility function. Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004) provide asymptotic properties of generalized method of moments estimators (GMM; see Hansen (1982) ) for estimating consumers' preference parameters in the pure characteristics models. In recent years, there have been increasing applications of pure characteristics models in the economics literature. For example, by using pure characteristics models, Song (2007) measure consumer welfare from new computer central processing unit (CPU), and Nosko (2011) examines how firms make product line decision in the CPU market. Argawal (2012) adopts this framework for modeling medical residents' preferences and indirect utility in a study of two-sided matching markets between hospitals and medical residents. Without the idiosyncratic logit error term in a consumer's utility function, estimating the pure characteristics demand model with the GMM estimator becomes computationally challenging; see the discussion in Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2006) . The main computational difficulty arises from the fact that for a given vector of structural parameters, using numerical integration to approximate aggregate market shares results in nonsmooth and discontinuous market share equations in unobserved product characteristics. Another computational difficulty is that one cannot show that there exists a contraction mapping to invert market share equations and compute unobserved product characteristics. Therefore, when using the nested fixed-point approach (Rust (1987) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) ) to estimate pure characteristic demand models ), the objective function in the GMM estimator can be a nonsmooth and discontinuous function of unknown structural parameters. Consequently, the nested fixed-point approach gives rise to an optimization problem that is not tractable by exiting optimization methods and softwares and is at best an ad hoc computational approach for estimating pure characteristics models. Moreover, it is not possible to carry out any kind of theoretical analysis on the resulting optimization problem derived from this approach.
Summary of contributions
This paper makes several important contributions in the extended modeling of the estimation problem of pure characteristics demand models with firm pricing, yielding in particular a proof of solvability and computationally viable solution methods for estimating the model parameters. In the order they are presented in the main sections, these contributions are summarized below
Exogenous pricing:
(A) By way of characterizing consumers' decision problem using complementarity constraints, we formulate the GMM estimation problem of the pure characteristics demand model, which involves integral expressions equating expected market shares with observed market shares, as a computationally tractable quadratic optimization problem with complementarity constraints, parameterized by an exponential, thus nonlinear, function of the structural coefficient of price. When the latter coefficient is fixed, the optimization problem becomes a quadratic program with linear complementarity constraints (QPCC). The QPCC has received much focused attention in the mathematical programming literature in recent years; see e.g. Jiang and Ralph (1999) and the most recent paper of Bai, Mitchell, and Pang (2012) and the references contained therein. In turn, the QPCC can be used as a workhorse for solving the overall GMM estimation problem in a grid search routine for the optimal selection of the scalar price coefficient.
(B) The reformulation in (A) allows us to establish the existence of a solution to the sampled GMM estimation problem; however, the convergence of such a discretized problem to the original expected-value formulation of the problem is not addressed in this work. In this vein, we should mention that a seminal paper by Wets (1999) has laid down the fundamental role of optimization in statistical estimation; we expect that the results in this reference will be instrumental in understanding the connections between the finite-dimensional mathematical programming formulation and the original structural estimation problem, in particular, about the statistical properties of the solutions to the discretized models that we derive.
Endogenous pricing:
(C) We introduce a Nash-Bertrand price competition game in which firms make pricing decisions of the products they produce, taking into account consumers' choice preferences of the products.
Existence of an equilibrium solution to this game model is established and Lemke's algorithm applied to a linear complementarity formulation (Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992) ) of the game.
(D) As discussed in Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) , one of the primary uses of demand models is to study the effect of price changes on consumer welfare. To conduct such analysis, researchers need to infer firms' marginal costs, which are usually not observed in the data. We extend the basic structural estimation problem to include the above competitive pricing problem of the firms for inferring marginal costs. This is the first time where several distinct aspects of this structural estimation problem for pure characteristics models are cast in a unifying framework that includes: (a) the firms' pricing problem of the products they sell, (b) the market clearing mechanism of consumers' purchase decisions consistent with the firms' determined prices, and (c) the GMM estimation of the model parameters in the consumer's utility functions that incorporates the former two aspects of supply (the firms' pricing problems) and demand (the consumers' purchase behavior).
(E) With nonlinearities in the complementarity constraints, the extended estimation problem is similarly shown to have an optimal solution, via an argument that extends the case of exogenous prices.
Computational results:
(F) Numerical results show that the methods developed in the paper can recover correct parameter values using data generated from the underlying pure characteristics models.
The end result is that we have enriched the modeling of this estimating problem, providing added realism to the resulting models, and established their computational tractability via existing numerical algorithms for solving mathematical programs with complementarity constraints (MPCC; (Luo, Pang and Ralph (1996) ).
The starting point in our reformulation of the nonsmooth and discontinuous approximated market share equations is to formulate a consumer's decision problem as a linear program. The resulting primal-dual optimality conditions then fully characterize a consumer's optimal purchase decision. Aggregating each consumer's purchase decision then gives the predicted market share for each product. The advantage of our reformulation is that the approximated market share equations become a smooth function of unobserved product characteristics and structural parameters and are characterized by a system of complementarity constraints, thus are amenable to effective solution by mathematical programming methods.
As highlighted above, our contribution extends beyond the complementarity constrained quadratic programming reformulation of the estimation problem and incorporates aspects of the pure characteristics models that are not previously considered. The resulting mathematical programming formulation of the estimation problem with endogenous prices remains computationally tractable. Besides computational tractability, the presented models also lays a constructive framework within which rigorous analysis can be carried out for this class of structural estimation problems; for instance, providing a proof of the existence of an optimal solution -see Theorem 1.
Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the consumer's utility model. We give the current formulation for the aggregate market share equations approximated by numerical integration as well as the current formulation of the GMM estimation problem. We briefly discuss the difficulties in using the nested fixed-point approach for the GMM estimation of the pure characteristics demand model. In Section 3, we present a simple linear programming (LP) formulation of the consumer's decision problem that leads to a smooth reformulation of approximated market share equations. We then embed the LPs' optimality conditions as complementarity constraints in the overall estimation problem with exogenous pricing and formulate the estimation problem as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints. We establish the existence of an optimal solution to this MPCC. In Section 4, we formulate the firms' competitive pricing problems and a market clearing mechanism. We propose a Nash-Bertrand pricing game that guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. We present a corresponding linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation for computing an equilibrium. In Section 5, we present the parameter estimation problem with endogenous pricing formulated as a MPCC and establish the existence of an optimal solution to this problem. In Section 6, we present numerical results for solving the estimation problems and discuss the findings. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7. The notations employed in the paper are summarized in an Appendix.
The Pure Characteristics Demand Model
The first two subsections of this section present the consumer's utility model and the derivation of the aggregate market shares, respectively. The third subsection gives an optimization formulation of the current approach to the GMM parameter estimation problem with exogenous price, which as we will see is not computationally tractable. The reformulation of this estimation problem into a computationally tractable formulation is introduced subsequently.
Consumer's utility function
There are T markets and J products in each market. The product j in market t is characterized by the tuple (x jt , p jt , ξ jt ) ∈ R K+2 . Throughout this section, the prices p jt are exogenous to the model. The vector x jt ∈ R K contains K observed product characteristics, p jt ∈ R is the observed price assumed to be exogenously given in this section and the next, and ξ jt ∈ R is the product characteristic or demand shock that is observed by the firms and consumers but is not available in the data (and is thus a variable to be estimated by the model). In pure characteristics demand models, consumer i's utility from purchasing product j in market t is given by
with the denoting transposition. The vector β i ∈ R K and scalar α i model the consumer i's preference or taste for the observed product characteristics x jt and price p jt , respectively. Each consumer also has the no-purchase option (or purchase of the outside good j = 0) with the utility u i0t = 0.
In the discrete choice setting, each consumer will purchase only one product. Consumer i chooses to purchase product j in market t if and only if
We allow for heterogeneous consumer preferences. We assume that consumers' preference for the k-th product characteristic is normally distributed with meanβ k and standard deviation σ βk ;
consumers' taste for price is log-normally distributed with mean √ eᾱ and standard deviation e(e − 1)ᾱ. Note that these means and standard deviations are consumer independent. More specifically, consumer i's preferences (β i , α i ), are realizations of random variables given as follows:
where η ik and w i are i.i.d. draws from the standard normal distribution N (0, 1) for all i and k.
and Θ ᾱ,β, σ β be the tuple of structural parameters that need to be estimated from available market data. This estimation problem is the main concern of the pure characteristics modeling of consumers' preferences over these products. Throughout this paper, we assume that the parameter tuple Θ is restricted to an admissible set Υ in R 1+2K . 
Aggregate market shares
Define the set of consumer preferences (β, α) that lead to the purchase of product j in market t:
We denote by F (β;β, σ β ) and G(α;ᾱ) the distribution functions of consumer preferences β and α, respectively. The predicted market share for product j in market t is then given by
where ξ t = (ξ jt ) J j=1 denote the vector of unobserved characteristics for all products in market t. As there is no closed-form expression to evaluate the integral in the predicted market share in general, numerical integration techniques are used to provide an approximation and analyze pricing equilibrium in the approximated setting. For simplicity, we use Monte Carlo simulation to take N samples of β i and α i from F (β;β, σ β ) and G(α;ᾱ), respectively to obtain an approximation:
where 1 is the indicator function. These draws may be thought of as selective consumers whose product choices provide the data for the parameter estimation. Notice that because of the indicator function used in (3), the approximated predict market share function s j (ξ t (Θ); Θ) is a nonsmooth and even discontinuous function of structural parameters Θ.
Let M t be the population in market t and q jt the observed quantity sold for product j in market t. Define S jt q jt M t the observed market share of product j in market t in the data. Expressed as fractions, the observed market shares S jt satisfy the following conditions:
where S t denotes the tuple {S jt } J j=1 of market shares of all the products in market t. Given the approximation in (3), the system of market share equations requires the approximated predicted market share to be equal to the observed market share in the data. For the purpose of our discussion, assume that for a given Θ, there exists a unique ξ t (Θ) such that 1 s j (ξ t (Θ); Θ) = S jt , for j = 0, 1, . . . , J, t = 1, . . . , T.
We use ξ t (Θ) to denote its dependence on Θ and let ξ(Θ) = {ξ t (Θ)} T t=1 be the collection of ξ t (Θ). Because of the indicator function used in the approximation in (3), the market share equation (4) is what we referred to as "nonsmooth and discontinuous approximated market share equations in unobserved product characteristics" for a given vector of structural parameters Θ. ):
where ξ(Θ) is a solution of the approximated market share equation (4). A major computational challenge in solving the above GMM estimation problem is to solve for the unobserved demand shock ξ(Θ) for each guess of the parameters Θ. This is not easy to say the least; in particular there is no contraction mapping for solving the market share equation (4). Even worse, there is in general no guarantee of the unique solvability of (4); i.e., the solution ξ(Θ) could be multi-valued. Added to this challenge is that the approximation in (3) involves an indicator function. As a result, the market share equation (4) is fairly complicated, in particular, not smooth; Newton's method, or for that matter any method, can not be guaranteed to successfully compute ξ(Θ), or a member of this solution set if equation (4) has multiple solutions. For more discussion on the computational difficulties for inverting the demand shocks ξ, see Berry and Pakes (2007) and Song (2006) .
From an optimization perspective, the problem of needing to invert the market share equation (4) for each guess of parameters Θ can be avoided by observing that the minimization problem (5) is equivalent to the constrained optimization problem (Su and Judd (2012) , and Dubé, Fox and Su (2012) ): minimize
where
is the collection of ξ t . Nevertheless, this reformulated problem does not help in easing the theoretical and computational challenges of solving the estimation problem, due to the presence of the indicator function in s j (ξ t ; Θ). First, one has to establish the existence of an optimal solution to the problem (6). In general, this can be accomplished by verifying/assuming the feasibility of the problem and then establishing for instance the compactness of solutions to the market shares constraints (4). By assuming the compactness of Υ, the latter task is then focused on the boundedness of the demand shocks ξ t . If one assumes the unique dependence of ξ t on Θ, i.e., the unique solvability of (4) for a given Θ, then the existence of an optimal solution of (6) is fairly easy to establish; but such a unique feasibility assumption is not verifiable in practice. Second, as stated, the formulation (6) is not amenable to solution by existing computational methods or softwares.
Both drawbacks of the current approach to the resolution of the estimation problem of the pure Pang, Su and Lee: A Constructive Approach to Estimating Pure Characteristics Models Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. (Please, provide the manuscript number!) 9 characteristic demand model will be remedied by our constructive reformulation to be presented in the next section. Moreover, motivated by the more fundamental question of how market prices are determined, in particular, whether they are related to firms' competitive behavior, we are led to extend the approach to allow pricing decisions being made by the producing firms. In the analysis, we discover a new condition (see (18)) on the instrument matrix Z ξ that is needed to ensure the solvability of the estimation problem.
Constructive Reformulations
We begin our reformulation by first casting the consumers' purchasing decision problems as linear programs (LPs) in Subsection 3.1. This allows us to embed the LPs' optimality conditions as complementarity constraints in the overall estimation problem that will be presented in Subsection 3.2.
Consumers' decision problems as LPs
We present a smooth reformulation of the market share equation (4). To avoid the use of the indicator function in (4), we introduce individual choice probabilities over the products and the nopurchase option. Let π ijt be the choice probability that consumer i purchases product j in market t, for j = 0, . . . , J. Recalling that consumer i purchases the product (including the no-purchase option) that gives her the highest utility, we can model consumer i's purchase decision problem in market t defined in (1) as a linear program:
By linear programming theory, it follows that (7) must have a basic optimal solution that has only one π ijt = 1 and all the other π ij t = 0 for j = j; this means that in any given market t, one optimal choice of consumer i is to purchase only 1 product. More generally, a probability tuple
is an optimal solution of (7) if and only if there exists a constraint multiplier γ it such that for all
It is easily seen that such a multiplier γ it satisfies:
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i.e., γ it is consumer i's maximum utility over all products in market t at the price tuple p t = {p jt } J j=1 . The complementarity condition stipulates that the consumers' choices of the products are based on the maximum ranking(s) of their utilities of the products at the prevalent prices.
The estimation problem with exogenous price as a MPCC
By aggregating the individual consumer's choice probability π ijt , we obtain the predicted market share for product j in market t as
where π ijt satisfies the optimality conditions (8), for all i = 1, · · · , N , j = 1, · · · , J, and t = 1, · · · , T .
Imposing the optimality conditions (8) and market share equation (10) as constraints, we can reformulate the GMM estimator (5) (or its constrained formulation (6)) as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints and a quadratic objective function:
In both the original formulation (5) of the GMM estimation problem and its reformulation (11), the prices p jt are exogenous inputs to the model. Thus, except for the complementarity constraints, the only nonlinearity in the constraints of (11) is in the term exp(ᾱ w i ) withᾱ being a variable.
Moreover, for each fixedᾱ, the optimization problem (11) is a QPCC with a convex quadratic objective function and linear complementarity constraints, whose global resolution has been the focused subject of the recent paper by Bai, Mitchell, and Pang (2012) , and whose practical computation can be accomplished by a host of nonlinear programming solvers available on the neos solvers http://www.neos-server.org/neos/, such as snopt, knitro, filter and others.
Existence of an optimal solution
In this subsection, we show that the MPCC (11) has an optimal solution. We first establish the feasibility of this problem in Proposition 1 below. Proposition 1. The MPCC (11) has a feasible solution.
∈ Υ, the feasible set of the MPCC (11) consists of tuples (Θ, ξ, π, γ) satisfying the following conditions:
For given data {x jkt , η ik , w i , p jt } and fixed but arbitrary tuple Θ = ᾱ,
, the above complementarity conditions constitute the optimality conditions (primal and dual feasibility plus complementary slackeness) of the following LP in the variables {π ijt }:
with ξ jt being the multiplier of the constraint 1 N N i=1 π ijt = S jt and γ it being the multiplier of the constraint:
S jt ≤ 1 for all t, the above LP is feasible and thus has an optimal solution. Hence the feasibility of the MPCC (11) follows.
It turns out that this MPCC has an equivalent formulation as a bilevel optimization problem.
The dual of the LP (13) is
ξ jt S jt subject to for all i = 1, · · · , N ; t = 1, · · · , T ; and j = 1, · · · , J :
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which can be seen to be equivalent to:
specifically, a tuple
is optimal for (14) if and only if
is optimal for (15) and
Thus, the MPCC (11), and hence the GMM estimation problem (6) with the market shares approximated by the finite sample average (3), is equivalent to a bilevel program with the estimator Θ as the "design variable" and the consumers' maximum utilities
as the "inner decision variable":
and for all t = 1, · · · , T :
Note that the objective function in the inner-optimization problem is convex and piecewise linear in the variables
and parameterized by Θ. In light of the recent advances on bilevel optimization, the above is a new formulation of the structural estimation problem that can potentially be put to use computationally; nevertheless this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
Returning to the solvability of the MPCC (11), we present the following existence result that postulates a certain positive row independence condition (18) of the instrument matrix Z ξ ; this condition is considerably weaker than the requirement of row linear independence that is not valid for this matrix because it typically has more row than columns. To state this condition, let
be the set of markets where the observed market shares do not sum to unity. 
holds, then (11) has an optimal solution.
Proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to show that for every constant c > 0, the set
such that ( Θ; ξ; π, γ ) is feasible to (11) is compact. We first show that L c is bounded. Let {ξ ν } be a sequence of vectors in L c . We have
∈ Υ for each ν, be an associated sequence such that for every ν, the tuple (Θ ν , π ν , γ ν , ξ ν ) is feasible to (11). Suppose that for some pair (j, t), the subsequence {ξ ν jt } ν∈κ → −∞, where κ is an infinite index set. From the complementarity condition:
we deduce that π ν ijt = 0 for all ν ∈ κ sufficiently large and all i = 1, · · · , N . But this contradicts the market share equation:
Hence, lim inf ν→∞ ξ ν jt > −∞ for every (j, t). Thus, if the sequence {ξ ν } is unbounded, then the normalized sequence {ξ ν / ξ ν } must have at least one accumulation point; moreover, any such point must be nonzero and nonnegative. Let ξ denote any such accumulation point; it follows readily from (19) that Z ξ ξ = 0. Consider a market t ∈ T . Given the definition of T in (17), we have
which contradicts the choice that t ∈ T . Hence {ξ ν jt } is bounded for all j = 1, · · · , J if t ∈ T , which yields ξ t = 0 for such a market t. By assumption (18), we have ξ = 0, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof of the boundedness of the sequence {ξ ν }. To show the closedness of L c , Let {ξ ν } ⊂ L c be a sequence converging to a limit ξ ∞ . This limit clearly satisfies 
∈ Υ for each ν, be an associated sequence such that for every ν, the tuple (Θ ν , π ν , γ ν , ξ ν ) is feasible to (11). Without loss of generality we may assume that {(Θ ν , π ν )} converges to a limit (Θ ∞ , π ∞ ). Since
Remark 1. By a theorem of the alternatives, it is obvious that the implication (18) is equivalent to the existence of a vector ρ ∈ R H such that Z ξ ρ > 0. Since there is no clear condition in the constraints of the problem (11) that would easily imply the boundedness of the demand shock variables ξ t , we impose such a condition on the instrument matrix Z ξ to formally establish the existence of an optimal GMM estimator.
The Firms' Pricing Problems
We next turn to firms' pricing problems where the prices p jt are determined endogenously by their respective producing firms who compete for the consumers' purchase of the products under a multi-product Bertrand pricing framework. Thus, in additional to the J products, N representative consumers, and T markets, there are F profit-maximizing firms, each of which producing a subset of the J products. We denote by J f the set of products produced by firm f , and assume that J f ∩ J g = ∅ for f = g, and f J f = {1, 2, . . . , J}; i.e., firms produce distinct products. This is a reasonable assumption. Even if two products have the same observed characteristics, by including brand (producing firms' identify) as an additional observed characteristic, we can differentiate the two products and consider them as distinct.
Let mc jt be the marginal cost of producing product j in market t and mc f (mc jt ) j∈J f ;t=1,··· ,T be the tuple of firm f 's marginal costs of its products. Denote a price tuple by
, where
are the product prices determined by firm f and its rival firms, respectively. The total profit of firm f from all markets is
where the approximated predicted market share s j (ξ t ; Θ) is given in (3). We assume that the firms are playing a Nash-Bertrand pricing game. Specifically, given the characteristics of its products and the marginal costs, firm f chooses prices p f to maximize its total profit, anticipating its opponents' product prices and characteristics as fixed but arbitrary. Thus, a vector p * = (p * jt ) j,t is a NashBertrand equilibrium if for each firm f , the vector of prices p *
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The difficulty in analyzing and characterizing a Nash-Bertrand pricing equilibrium as described above lies in the firm's profit function that involves the use of the indicator function in the predicted market shares function (3). Although the expression
together with the the complementarity conditions (8) could be used to convert the predicted market shares into smooth functions, the latter conditions render firm f 's optimization problem (21) an MPCC. Specifically, substituting (22) into the profit function Π f (p) in (20) and incorporating the complementarity conditions (8) on the choice probabilities into the constraints, we formulate firm f 's pricing problem as:
where we have written O f (p, π f ) for Π f (p) to express the explicit dependence of this objective function on the choice probability vector π
; the superscript "f " is attached to π f ijt to signify firm f 's perception of the consumers' choice probabilities to purchase the various products j = 1, · · · , J. Notice that the vector of choice probabilities π f in firm f 's decision problem includes products produced by other firms because price changes for firm f 's products will affect consumers' choices on other firms' products. To complete the problem formulation, a "market clearing condition" is imposed to specify that at an equilibrium, we must have π
While the pricing problem (23) together with the market clearing conditions fully capture the firms' recognition of consumers' product choices, mathematically, the resulting competitive pricing game problem among the firms becomes a so-called equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), due to the presence of the complementarity conditions in the constraints in each firm's optimization problem (23); see the Ph.D. thesis of Su (2005) for a basic introduction to the EPEC. To date, the EPEC is a non-tractable mathematical problem whose rigorous analysis and solution methods remain elusive. Thus in treating the parameter estimation problem, which adds yet another layer of complication with an objective function set on top of the equilibrium problem, ) it is not practical to employ the EPEC formulation to model the firms' price competition; i.e., it is impractical to add the EPEC to the constraints of (6) or (11). Our resolution is to propose an alternative Nash-Bertrand pricing game formulated as a linear complementarity problem (LCP), which allows us to obtain a computationally tractable formulation for the parameter estimation problem that incorporates the firms' pricing decisions. This alternative model is based on two key ideas: the first is the observation that under the complementarity conditions (8), the firm's objective function has an equivalent representation that provides insights into the firms' decisions in setting their prices; and the second is the commonly employed technique in dealing with coupled Nash games that "pulls out" the coupled constraints, which in this case, are the complementarity conditions on the consumers' choice probabilities.
An alternative model for the firm's pricing problem
Given a price p t and a tuple (i, j, , t) with j ∈ J f and j = ≥ 1, let r ij t (p ,t ) be the price for product j that firm f needs to set to equate consumer i's utility for product j with her utility for product at the prevalent price p t ; i.e., r ij t (p t ) satisfies
or equivalently,
We have in particular ζ ijjt = 0 and r ijjt (p jt ) = p jt . Set also
which is the price of product j at which consumer i's utility for this product in market t is zero.
Thus the consumer i's utility for product j in market t will be negative if the price of product j is above this value r ij0t . Note that ζ ij t and r ij0t are both constants for given values of the parameters β i and α i . We call r ij t (p t ) the consumer-specific pseudo-price of product j relative to product with price p t for consumer i in market t.
Similar to r ij0t , given a price tuple p, the pseudo-price r ij t (p t ) has a natural interpretation. At the prevalent prices p jt and p t , consumer i's utilities in market t of the two products j and are, respectively, x jt β i − α i p jt + ξ jt and x t β i − α i p t + ξ t . Suppose the former utility is greater than the latter, then firm f can increase the price p jt while keeping the former utility above the latter.
The critical value of the increased price at which the two utilities become equal is the relative
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pseudo-price r ij t (p t ). A similar decrease of the price p jt can be made to equate the two utilities if
x jt β i − α i p jt + ξ jt is less than x t β i − α i p t + ξ t . Thus, r ij t (p t ) is the price of product j that will make consumer i attain the same preference for these two products in terms of their respective utilities.
We also impose an additional constraint below in each firm's optimization problem so that some consumers will prefer purchasing one of the firm's products to the no-purchase option.
where δ f > 0 is a prescribed lower target of the sum of the consumers' utilities of firm f 's products in all markets that firm f sets for itself in making its pricing decisions. This extra constraint ensures that at least one of firm f 's products will induce a positive utility for some consumer(s) in some market(s); it also provides a natural upper bound on the prices of a firm's products. Note that an upper bound of the summation term in (24) is obtained when firm f sets its product prices at marginal costs:
Based on the pseudo-prices r ij t (p t ) and the additional constraint on total consumer utilities induced by the firm's products, we can define the firms' optimization problems that will be the cornerstone for the alternative Nash-Bertrand price competitive game for the firms to determine their product prices respecting the consumers' utilities. Specifically, anticipating the price tuple p −f of the rival firms and also the probability tuple π f (π ijt )
of consumers' choices for products j ∈ J f in market t, firm f determines a price tuple p f by solving
The quantity
is the minimum price that firm f should set for product j in market t specific to consumer i so that this consumer's utility for this product is nonnegative and at least as high as that for all products at their respective prevalent prices p t . Each summand
is firm f 's average minimum per-share pseudo-profit in market t specific to consumer i for all products manufactured by this firm. Also notice that the complementarity conditions (8) are removed from firms' pricing problems and will be treated as a market clearing mechanism instead in the next subsection.
Market clearing
We provide an interpretation of the complementarity conditions (8) as a market clearing mechanism to determine the probability tuple π (π ijt )
. This market clearing condition is posed as a linear program parameterized by the firms' price tuple p:
The objective function O s (p, π) of this market optimization problem can be interpreted as the expected system (i.e., including all consumers in all markets) benefit under the prevalent product price-choice probability pair. The above market clearance condition provides the key to equate the two objective functions: the original objective O f (p, π), which is equal to Π f (p), and the alternative objective O f (p, π). Indeed suppose that (8) holds, which implies that γ it is given by (9). We then
Thus, under the complementarity condition (8), the two objectives O f (p, π) and O f (p, π) coincide.
A modified Nash-Bertrand price game
A Nash-Bertrand equilibrium of firms' price competition is a solution to the non-cooperative game wherein each firm solves the problem (26) given the rival firms' product prices and the consumers' choice probabilities and the market clearing condition (27) holds given firms' product prices. Specifically, with Θ (β, σ β ,ᾱ) and (mc jt )
as exogenously given inputs, such an equilibrium is, by definition, a tuple of product prices and choice probabilities:
and π * π * ijt such that
• π * ∈ argmax
Notice that each firm's objective function O f (•, p −f , π) is concave in its own variable p f and
is linear in the choice probabilities. Moreover, the sum constraint in (26) yields the following inequality:
which together with the lower bounds p jt ≥ mc jt implies that the price tuple p is bounded. Since the choice probabilities are also bounded, it follows readily that this modified game has a Nash equilibrium solution, which may not be unique however. While the existence of a Nash equilibrium to the modified game is easily confirmed, since each function O f (p, π) is non-differentiable, the computation of such an equilibrium solution is not straightforward. In what follows, we provide a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation of this game that offers a constructive approach to accomplish this computational task.
We first write each firm's optimization problem (26) as a linear program by introducing the auxiliary variables
Let r ( r ijt ). Then the equivalent LP is:
subject to for all t = 1, · · · , T ; i = 1, · · · , N ; = 1 · · · , J, and j ∈ J f : Let v ijt r ij0t − r ijt and p jt p jt − mc jt . Note that p t for ∈ J f is exogenous in the firm f 's LP above. We can rewrite the above linear program as:
subject to for all t = 1, · · · , T ; i = 1, · · · , N ; = 1 · · · , J, and j ∈ J f :
Introducing multipliers λ ij t and µ f for the last two constraints in (29), we can write down the optimality conditions of this LP as follows: for all t = 1, · · · , T ; i = 1, · · · , N ; and j ∈ J f :
Substituting p jt p jt − mc jt into the price complementarity conditions (8), we can write these conditions as:
The conditions (30) and (31) define a linear complementarity problem:
where the variable z consists of the following: for all t = 1, · · · , T ; i = 1, · · · , N ; = 1, · · · , J; f = 1, · · · , F ; j ∈ J f , the vector b and matrix M are appropriately defined with
and the vector b contains the parameters α i , β i , ξ jt and mc jt , which are exogenous to the firms' pricing game but endogenous to the overall estimation problem to be presented later. We call the LCP (32) derived from (30) and (31) the Nash-Bertrand price LCP. In the theorem below, we show that a solution to this LCP, for all values of the parameters, can be computed by the renowned Lemke's algorithm; see Section 4.4 in Cottle, Pang, and Stone (1992) .
Theorem 2.
Under the condition (25), the modified Nash-Bertrand price competitive game has an equilibrium solution that can be computed by Lemke's algorithm applied to the LCP (32) derived from (30) and (31).
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show that the matrix M is copositive, i.e., z M z ≥ 0 for all z ≥ 0.
We have remaining components of z that are not necessarily zero are v ijt , p jt , µ f , and γ it . With δ f defined in (25), we have
as desired. [Note: the proof does not require the variables v ijt , p jt , µ f , and γ it to be zero.] This is enough for us to apply Theorem 3.8.6 in Cottle, Pang and Stone (1992) to obtain the result.
While an equilibrium is guaranteed, uniqueness of such an equilibrium is not. Nevertheless, for solving the estimation problem to be presented next, the multiplicity of equilibrium prices is lesser of an issue than the question of whether an equilibrium would satisfy the market share equation.
We address the latter question in greater length and propose a resolution in the next section.
The Estimation Problem with Endogenous Pricing
One of the primary uses of demand models is to study the effect of price changes on consumer welfare (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) ). To conduct such analysis, researchers need to infer firms' marginal costs, which are usually not observed in the data. One common way to infer firms' marginal costs so is to include firms' pricing model in the overall estimation problem.
In this section, we augment the estimation problem with exogenous pricing (11) by incorporating the firms' competitive pricing problems. Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we assume that marginal costs mc jt have the following functional form:
where y jt ∈ R K T is an observed vector of product characteristics that may overlap with some
is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated, and ω jt , similar to ξ jt is an unobserved component. The expanded structural parameters are denoted by the tuple Θ = {β, σ β ,ᾱ, φ} ∈ Υ that is restricted to belong to the admissible set Υ of side constraints. In what follows, we present the details of the overall estimation problem of the tuple Θ that incorporates the marginal cost expression (34) containing the unknown parameter φ and the unobserved component ω jt and the firms' modified Nash-Bertrand pricing game that includes the last constraint in (26).
Embedding the price game and marginal cost in the estimation
In addition to the marginal cost expression (34), there a set of observed market prices p obs jt of the products that the resulting estimation model needs to account for. This gives rise to the question of how these prices are related to the theoretical prices derived from the Nash-Bertrand game that models the firms' profit maximization behavior. Since we postulate that the results of the latter game are the basis for how the product prices are determined in the market, it seems reasonable to calibrate the model parameters in order to minimize the discrepancy (if it is nonzero) between the computed equilibrium prices and the observed prices p obs jt . In what follows, we include such a least-squares term in the estimation objective in addition to the GMM term that is the basis for the parameter estimation. Furthermore, the marginal costs given in (34), should be bounded above by the market prices p obs jt . The resulting in the bounds: 0 ≤ mc jt ≤ p obs jt , becomes constraints on the structural parameter φ and the unobservable quantity ω jt .
Introducing the Nash-Bertrand game to model the firms' behavior leads to a possible distortion of the market shares equation. More precisely, to simultaneously impose as hard constraints two distinct behaviorial assumptions among the firms (competitive in prices) and consumers (utility maximizing in product choices) to fit the observed market shares equation may be unrealistic because there may be inconsistencies between these empirical data and the behavioral assumptions.
Thus, we again adopt a least-squares approach to account for the possibility of a mismatch between the data and the behavioral postulates. Theoretically, provided that the model could be solved to global optimality, it should be capable to reveal the exact fitness if no discrepancy exists.
The above discussion summarizes the consequences resulting from incorporating firms' profit maximizing behavior in the overall GMM estimation problem presented below. This optimization problem takes as inputs the observed data: {x jt , y jt } of product characteristics, p obs jt of product prices, and q jt of product quantities sold, employs a regularized GMM objective for the estimation of the structural parameter tuple Θ, properly weighs this objective with the two least-squares terms mentioned above, and includes as constraints the Nash-Bertrand price equilibrium game formulated as the LCP (32) that concatenates the firms' and consumers' behavior through (30) and (31), respectively. The regularization of the GMM objective is to ensure the boundedness of the demand shocks variable ξ. Specifically, for prescribed positive weighing constants ζ p and ζ m and an arbitrary scalar ζ ξ > 0, the model is (with I denoting the identity matrix of order J × T ): Similar to Theorem 1, we have the following existence result for the above estimation problem, which, because of the regularization term in the objective function, does not require any assumption on the instrument matrix Z ξ .
Theorem 3. Suppose that the set Υ is compact and the weighting matrices W ξ and W ω are positive definite. The problem (35) has an optimal solution.
Proof of Theorem 3. For any tuple Θ = {β, σ β ,ᾱ, φ} ∈ Υ, since there is no restriction on the parameters ξ jt , they can be chosen so that
By choosing ω jt p obs jt − y jt φ so that mc jt = p obs jt and thus (25) is satisfied, it follows that the problem (35) is feasible, by Theorem 2. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, it remains to show that for every constant c > 0, the set L c { ( ξ; ω; p; π ) | objective of (35) ≤ c and ∃ (ᾱ,β, φ, v, λ, µ, γ) such that the tuple ( Θ, ξ, ω, z) is feasible to (35) is compact. We first show that L c is bounded
From the bounds: 0 ≤ y jt φ ν + ω ν jt ≤ p obs jt and the boundedness of φ ν , it follows that {ω ν jt } is bounded for all pairs (j, t) Thus (36) implies that { p ν jt } is also bounded for all pairs (j, t). Since the matrix Z ξ W ξ Z ξ + ζ ξ I is positive definite, the sequence {ξ ν } is bounded. This is enough to establish the boundedness of the level set L c . Unlike the proof of closedness in Theorem 1, the proof of closedness L c in the present case requires a bit more care; for one thing, the market shares equations are not set in the constraints. Specifically, let {( ξ ν ; ω ν ; p ν ; π ν )} be a sequence of vectors in L c converging to a limit ( ξ ∞ ; ω ∞ ; p ∞ , π ∞ ). Clearly, the objective of (35) evaluated at this limit tuple does not
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it follows that the sequence {λ ν } is bounded. Since
it follows that the sequence {γ ν } is also bounded. For each f ∈ {1, · · · , F }, let
and define
We can readily verify that µ ν f , like µ ν f , satisfies the complementarity conditions:
, it follows that { µ ν f } is bounded. Similarly, we can redefine v ν ijt to ensure its boundedness. Specifically, let
We can verify that v ν ijt satisfies the complementarity conditions:
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. Hence, we can replace the tuple 
The rest of the proof can be completed easily by a simple limiting argument.
In the event that the observed quantities sold q jt are induced by a Nash-Bertrand price equilibrium, i.e., if the LCP (32) has a solution z for some parameters ( Θ, ξ, ω ) with Θ ∈ Υ so that the resulting choice probabilities π ijt (embedded in z) satisfy the market shares equations:
then instead of the optimization problem (35), we can consider the alternative problem where we impose the share equations as hard constraints and remove the regularization in the GMM objective; the resulting problem is as follows: 
Finally, if in addition the observed market prices p obs jt are derived from a solution z of the NashBertrand equilibrium LCP (32), i.e., p obs jt = mc jt + p jt for all (j, t), then we may impose the latter equations as hard constraints and consider a pure GMM objective function:
subject to • the Nash-Bertrand price LCP (32) in the variable z, where the vector b contains the parameters α i , β i , ξ jt , and mc jt y jt φ + ω jt
• the market shared equations (37) • p obs jt = mc jt + p jt ∀ (j, t) and
• for all t = 1, · · · , T ; i = 1, · · · , N ; j = 1, · · · , J; and k = 1, · · · , K :
If the latter problem is feasible, its solvability can be established under the weaker assumption (18). Nevertheless, in general, checking the feasibility of either (38) or (39) is not an easy task; in ) 27 the event that these cannot be verified easily, the GMM together with the regularized least-squares terms in (35) provides a viable formulation for the estimation of the structural parameters of the consumers' choice model embedded with the producing firms' profit maximizing behavior under Nash-Bertrand competition.
Numerical Results
We have carried out three sets of numerical experiments using synthetic data to validate the estimation models formulated in Section 3.2 and Section 5. The model and specifications considered in each experiment are described below:
Experiment 1: we consider the estimation problem with endogenous pricing (39) but without the δ f constraints and the associated µ f dual variables in firms' modified pricing problem (24).
Experiment 2: we consider the estimation problem with exogenous pricing (11).
Experiment 3: we return to the estimation problem with endogenous pricing (39), including the δ f constraint, the corresponding µ f dual variables and the associated complementarity.
The experiments with endogenous prices (Experiments 1 and 3) allow us to examine the following question: if these observables are indeed derived from a theoretical price equilibrium model, can the GMM estimator, and current optimization solvers recover the parameters in the latter model correctly? This is a non-trivial question to answer in practice because the estimation problems are highly complex, non-convex optimization problems with disjunctive constraints and the optimization solvers (e.g. those on neos) available for solving optimization problems with these features are generally not guaranteed to yield globally optimal solutions.
In solving the estimation problems with endogenous pricing (39) in Experiments 1 and 3, we do not estimate the parameterᾱ; instead, we fixᾱ at the true parameter value. Observe that, (30) and α i p jt in (31) become linear whenᾱ is fixed. Consequently, all the complementarity constraints embedded in the estimation problem (39) becomes linear complementarity, which makes the estimation problem easier to solve. We do not fixᾱ in Experiment 2.
The implementation of all experiments was coded in the AMPL programming language (Fourer, Gay, and Kernighan (2003) ). We used the snopt solver (Gill, Murray, and Saunders (2005) ) to solve the estimation problems. All the experiments were run on a desktop computer with CPU Intel i7-2600K, 16 GB memory and and Windows 7 operating system. In Section 6.1, we describe the process of generating the data for estimation. In Section 6.2, we report and discuss estimation results.
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Data generation for estimation
The dimensions of the estimation problems consist of several chosen values for the numbers of representative consumers N ∈ {5, 10, 50, 100}, markets T ∈ {3, 5, 10, 20}, products J ∈ {4, 10}, firms F ∈ {2, 5}, and instrumental variables H ∈ {4, 10, 12, 13, 20, 21, 24, 33}, respectively. Two ranges of values for the market populations M t were used: {5000, 5100, 5200, · · · , 6900} and {200, 201, 202, · · · , 209}. The observed product characteristics x jtk and y jtk were uniformly randomly generated from the interval (0, 1), and then used to construct the matrices of instrumental variables Z ξ and Z ω . The weighting matrices were generated as W ξ = Z ξ Z ξ + 10 −4 I H −1 and
, with I H being the identity matrix of order H; these expressions ensure the positive definiteness of the weighting matrices. We further generated vectors of unobserved product characteristics ξ and ω such that in some instances, they are in the null space of Z ξ and Z ω , respectively, while in others, they lie outside the respective null spaces.
3 The former null-space property satisfies the condition that columns in the instrumental variable matrices are orthogonal to the unobserved product characteristics. This allows us to validate the model readily because we expect to obtain a zero GMM objective value, provided that the rest of the model inputs are generated properly. The latter cases, where the orthogonal condition between ξ (ω) and the columns in Z ξ (Z ω ) is not satisfied, offers a test of generalization of the model and the estimator.
We choseᾱ and β inc k , σ
, where the superscript "inc" stands for "incumbent", to satisfy the prescribed bounds: β ≤β inc k ≤ β, σ β ≤ σ inc βk ≤ σ β , and φ ≤ φ inc k ≤ φ, a requirement in Theorem 3 for the set Υ to be bounded. The random samples η ik and w i were drawn from the standard normal distribution. From these values, we obtained β
and mc inc jt = y jt φ inc + ω jt , which were then used as inputs to compute equilibrium prices.
In the experiments with endogenous prices (Experiments 1 and 3), two key input data for estimation are the observed product prices p obs jt and observed product quantities sold q jt , which are obtained by solving the forward pricing problems. In Experiment 1, we consider a simplified version of the modified Nash-Bertrand pricing game in which we remove the δ f constraint (24) from the firm's pricing problem (26). It is easy to check that without the δ f constraint, any price tuple p * belonging to the set
along with the zero choice probability tuple π * = 0 constitutes a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. In other words, a trivial solution to the game is obtained when the firms set their product prices sufficiently high so that the no-purchase option dominates the option to buy for all consumers. Obviously, this trivial equilibrium is not interesting. To avoid this trivial equilibrium, we consider the optimization problem:
π ijt subject to ∃ p such that (p, π) is an equilibrium price-probability pair,
which can be formulated as a linear program with linear complementarity constraints (LPCC). We used the snopt solver to solve the LPCC (40).
The data and results for the problem instances in this forward pricing step are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively. 4 The solution p jt and π ijt of (40) are then used to compute
π ijt . These computed values p obs jt and q jt along with η ik and w i render the pure estimation problem (39) feasible and are part of the input data for estimation, while the tuple:
contains all the unknown variables to be solved. (40.26,39.21,37.01,31.9,38.67,44.18,32.32,31.56, 37.339,30.67,33.84) 5000, σβ = (0, 1. 45, 7.18, 6.62, 4.32, 4.46, 5.08, 5.28, 5.73, 3.61, 3.36) 5100, φ = (2.35, 2.17, 2.79, 3.61, 2.02, 2.47, 3.87, 2.45, 3.57, 2.82, 2.24) and 5200 P2 5 4 11 3 2 12 same as P1 except ξ and ω are nonzero and not in the same as P1 null space P3 50 4 3 20 2 4ᾱ (40.26, 39.21, 37.01) 5000 to 6900 σβ = (0, 4.34, 7.09) with increment φ = (2.23, 2.16, 2.74) of 100 (40.26, 39.21, 37.01, 31.9) 5000 to 5400 σβ = (0, 7.09, 1.16, 0.78) with increment φ = (2.74, 2.07, 2.38, 2.94) of 100 (40.26, 39.21, 37.01, 31.9, 38.67, 44.18, 32.32, 31.56) 5000 to 5900 σβ = (0, 0.34, 1.92, 4.71, 1.45, 7.18, 6.62, 4.32) with increment φ = (2.89, 3.02, 3.06, 3.15, 2.72, 2.67, 2.35, 2.17) of 100
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Validating the estimation models
In this section, we report and discuss numerical results from experiments. As discussed earlier, in Experiments 1 and 3, we fixᾱ at the true parameter value, i.e.,ᾱ = 1 (see Table 1 ), while in Experiment 2, we includeᾱ as an unknown variable to be solved in the estimation problem.
Experiment 1. In this set of experiment, we solved the estimation problem (39) without the δ f constraints and the associated µ f dual variables in firms' modified pricing problem (24). For problem instances where ξ = 0 and ω = 0 or ξ and ω were generated in the null space of Z ξ and Z ω , respectively, the optimal GMM objective value is indeed zero, as expected. Nevertheless, the model was not able to reproduce the incumbent parameter values β inc k , σ inc βk , φ inc k reported in Table 1 , from which the observed product prices p obs jt and product quantities sold q jt were calculated. One explanation is that there are multiple optimal solutions for these parameters, all producing a zero GMM objective value. To further validate the model in the reproduction of these incumbent parameter values, we add the following sum of squared deviations (SSD) from the incumbent values
to the GMM objective function in (39) and re-solved the estimation problem.
We report the estimation results with the SSD term added to the GMM objective function in Table 3 . As we have expected, for the instances E1, E3, E4, E6, and E11 where ω (ξ) was generated inside the null space of Z ω (Z ξ ), the incumbent values ofβ 31 not generated inside the null space, E2, E5 and E8 still recovered the exact incumbent parameter values and the overall optimal objective value is also 0; E7 was reported as infeasible ("infeasibilties minimized") by the SNOPT solver; E9 and E10 have nonzero objective values. A closer look at the SSD and the GMM terms in the objective function for instances E9 and E10 reveals that the nonzero objective values arise from the discrepancy between the incumbent and estimated φ-values.
For those two instances (E9 and E10), the SNOPT solver did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the solution is global optimum or not. The largest estimation problem we have tried is E11, which has 121,100 linear complementarity constraints and 123,320 equalities (see Table 1 ). The SNOPT solver successfully solved this instance after after 13,987 seconds. Table 3 Estimation results with endogenous prices and with the SSD term in the objective function. As briefly discussed above, we report in Table 4 the estimation results for some problem instances without adding the SSD term in (41) to the GMM objective function. All these instances were solved to global optimum having an objective value 0, but the mean-squared error (MSE, calculated as SSD/K) between the incumbent and estimated parameter values were not small. This obervation suggests that there are multiple optimal solutions satisfying the conditions of the model but the range of optimal parameter values can be wide. We also consider instances in which there are more instrumental variables than the numbers of products, markets, and observed product characteristics; specifically, we have H > JT > K.
The data are those of problem instances E1, E6, and E9 in Table 3 , except that we include more instrumental variables for estimation. In this set of runs, we included the SSD term in (41) in the objective function. Reported in Table 5 are the estimation results. The solver crashed when solving E17. In E16, E18 and E19, the SNOPT solver was able to recover the incumbent parameter values and obtained a zero GMM objective value. Nevertheless, in E20, both the SSD term of φ and the objective value are nonzero. Experiment 2. In this set of experiment, we consider estimation with exogenous pricing and solve the estimation problem (11). There are no φ-variable nor Nash-Bertrand price LCP constraints in (11). We used the prices computed for those problem instances in Table 2 as data. The estimation results are summarized in Table 6 . In problem instances S1-S8, the estimated parameters recovered the incumbent values when the SSD term
was included in the objective function. The optimal objective values in these problem instances are 0. Nevertheless, in instances S9-S11, when the SSD term was not added to the GMM objective, estimated values forᾱ,β and σ β all deviate from the incumbent values. Experiment 3. We return to the estimation problem with endogenous pricing (39), including the δ f constraint, the corresponding µ f dual variables and the associated complementarity. For data generation, we solve the Nash-Bertrand pricing LCP (32) with the constant δ f chosen to be 0.1δ f . We summarize the results from solving this Bertrand pricing LCP by using the solver path in Table 7 and report the corresponding purchasing behavior of the consumers in Table 8 . The results show significant effect of introducing the additional δ f constraint: the purchasing behavior is no longer skewed (i.e., either buy or not buy). This is in contrast to the results of the LPCC (40) reported in Table 2 , where most consumers tend to purchase only product 1.
Furthermore, there are cases where positive probabilities are obtained for products with equal utilities, exhibiting a "mixed-purchasing" behavior.
Using the inputs q jt and p obs jt calculated from the forward pricing problems MP1-MP5, we solved the parameter estimation problem (39) and reported the estimation results in Table 9 . Among ME1-ME5, only ME4 cannot recover the incumbent parameters where ξ and ω were not generated in the null space of Z ξ and Z ω respectively. In terms of estimation, the modified model does not seem to yield results significantly different from the original model. Table 9 Estimation results using forward prices computed from Table 9 for the problem instance MP4.
In practice, when researchers solve the estimation problem with endogenous pricing (39), true value ofᾱ (to be fixed) may not be known. In that case, we propose that one can first solve the estimation problem with exogenous pricing (11) without fixingᾱ (as we did in Experiment 2) and then use that solution to construct possible values ofᾱ to be fixed in solving the estimation problem (39).
Concluding Remarks
By means of a complementarity formulation of the original nonsmooth and discontinuous market share equations in the Berry-Pakes pure characteristics demand model, we have introduced some computationally tractable formulations for the parameter estimation in such a model that respects consumers' utility maximization of product choices. Our complementarity formulation of market share equations can be used in modeling firms' price decisions of their products in a competitive Nash-Bertrand game setting. The resulting models are of the MPCC type and can be solved by existing nonlinear programming solvers. The experimentation we have done demonstrates that the approach is viable in reproducing incumbent parameters on product prices and observed market shares that are consistent with the predicted model values.
